7 research outputs found
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences
A recent line of work, starting with Beigman and Vohra (2006) and
Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012), has addressed the problem of {\em learning} a
utility function from revealed preference data. The goal here is to make use of
past data describing the purchases of a utility maximizing agent when faced
with certain prices and budget constraints in order to produce a hypothesis
function that can accurately forecast the {\em future} behavior of the agent.
In this work we advance this line of work by providing sample complexity
guarantees and efficient algorithms for a number of important classes. By
drawing a connection to recent advances in multi-class learning, we provide a
computationally efficient algorithm with tight sample complexity guarantees
( for the case of goods) for learning linear utility
functions under a linear price model. This solves an open question in
Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012). Our technique yields numerous generalizations
including the ability to learn other well-studied classes of utility functions,
to deal with a misspecified model, and with non-linear prices
Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences
Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her
(divisible) goods when faced with a set of consumers, given that she can
only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed
preferences. We study both social welfare and profit maximization with revealed
preferences. Although social welfare maximization is a seemingly non-convex
optimization problem in prices, we show that (i) it can be reduced to a dual
convex optimization problem in prices, and (ii) the revealed preferences can be
interpreted as supergradients of the concave conjugate of valuation, with which
subgradients of the dual function can be computed. We thereby obtain a simple
subgradient-based algorithm for strongly concave valuations and convex cost,
with query complexity , where is the additive
difference between the social welfare induced by our algorithm and the optimum
social welfare. We also study social welfare maximization under the online
setting, specifically the random permutation model, where consumers arrive
one-by-one in a random order. For the case where consumer valuations can be
arbitrary continuous functions, we propose a price posting mechanism that
achieves an expected social welfare up to an additive factor of
from the maximum social welfare. Finally, for profit maximization (which may be
non-convex in simple cases), we give nearly matching upper and lower bounds on
the query complexity for separable valuations and cost (i.e., each good can be
treated independently)
Cooperative weakest link games
We introduce Weakest Link Games (WLGs), a cooperative game modeling domains where a team's value is determined by its weakest member. The game is represented as an edge-weighted graph with designated source and target vertices, where agents are the edges. The quality of a path between the source vertex and target vertex is the minimal edge weight along the path; the value of a coalition of edges is the quality of the best path contained in the coalition, and zero if the coalition contains no such path. WLGs model joint projects where the overall achievement depends on the weakest component, such as multiple-option package deals, or transport domains where each road has a different allowable maximum load. We provide methods for computing revenue sharing solutions in WLGs, including polynomial algorithms for calculating the value of a coalition, the core, and the least-core. We also examine optimal team formation in WLGs. Though we show that finding the optimal coalition structure is NP-hard, we provide an O(log n)-approximation. Finally, we examine the agents' resistance to cooperation through the Cost of Stability
Optimal-time adaptive strong renaming, with applications to counting
10.1145/1993806.1993850Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing239-24885LR